Hegemony and Law: Reconstructing the Global Legal Order under Asymmetric Power
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59890/ijsr.v3i6.213Keywords:
Hegemony, International Law, Power AsymmetryAbstract
This Paper examines the various ways that dominating states engage with international law in an effort to move beyond these viewpoints. It applies historical examples, primarily from the American, British, and Spanish periods of dominance, to construct a model of this connection based on international relations theory. The most prevalent trend seen is among those who try to substitute home legal systems that better facilitate formal hierarchies, instrumentalization, and retreat for international law. The final image ought to serve as a springboard for criticism and clarify why international law is both advantageous and immune to the use of force. Strong states derive their legitimacy from international law, but they must disassociate themselves from authority and thwart its simple conversion into law to acquire legitimacy. Then, between the demands of the powerful and the justice principles upheld in international society, international law maintains a position that is always unstable but ultimately secure. Many scholars argue that hegemony and international law cannot coexist because hegemons prefer political instruments over the latter, which is thought to rely on a balance of power. This aligns with the occasionally romanticized distinction between international law and politics, one utilizing power, the other standing for justice and reason. Realists and critical legal scholars have long challenged this idealization, but they usually do it by reducing international law to force.
References
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